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1. Introduction 
 
Going private transaction is no longer an unaccustomed term to mass investors. Many public 
firms are taken off the stock bourse one after another in Malaysia since 2005. Leveraged 
buyouts are widespread in US and UK since 1980s. However, going private phenomenon 
appeared in Malaysian equity market is different from the nature of leveraged buyouts and 
private equity (hereafter PE) backed deals which took place in many developed economies. 
PE  led  buyouts  are  still  underway  in  Malaysia.  In  contrast,  most  of  the  going  private 
proposals in Malaysia to date are undertaken by the largest dominant shareholders of the 
public corporations without the participation of PE players.  
 
Vast literature, among others, are explored by Kaplan (1989), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Weir 
et al. (2005a), Andres et al. (2007), Renneboog et al. (2007), and Stuart and Yim (2009) to 
examine going private buyouts driven by PE investors. Comparatively, research on going 
private transaction without the involvement of private equity sponsor is lacking.  
 
Halpern et al. (1999) treated leveraged buyout as heterogeneous with the respect to the level 
of  prior  managerial  shareholdings.  Firms  with  higher  insider  shareholdings  go  private 
voluntarily  in insider led buyout. Companies of this  kind insulate themselves  from being 
taken-over by hostile bidder. On the contrary, companies which have lower managerial stakes 
are subject to the threat of takeover (Halpern et al. 1999). This study holds similar view as 
Halpern  et  al.  (1999)  and  Firdmuc  et  al.  (2007)  that  public-to-private  population  is 
heterogeneous in terms of motivation of going private. Thus, this research excludes any PE 
backed deals in investigating the going private likelihood as we expect the reasons of taking 
the company private by the private equity players and controlling shareholders are distinct.  
 
PE buyouts are highly levered than other buyouts and typically PE investors own significant 
shareholdings, have board  seats  and  sometimes  replace  the  incumbent  managers  in post-
buyout  firms.  Additionally,  PE  firms  take  the  company  private  for  the  purpose  of 
restructuring and exiting it later through secondary buyout, reverse buyout and trade sale 
(Wright et al., 2006; Stromberg, 2009). PE investors participate in buyouts with the intention 
of realizing capital gains when they exit the buyout firm while controlling shareholders take 
the company private for long term strategic purpose. Moreover, insider led buyout tend to 
remain as private concern (Halpern et al., 1999).  
 
Due to the discrepancies in the rationales of attempting going private transactions between 
PE investors and insiders, this paper focuses on going private transactions initiated by the 
dominant shareholders. To cover the whole population, outside strategic buyers who have 
acquired majority shares in friendly takeover previously from the dominant shareholders and 
later triggered  the mandatory  general  offer  to buyout the whole  listed public  corporation 
successfully are also included in the sample.  
 
This paper contributes to the existing public-to-private takeover literature in the following 
respects.  First,  examination  of  the  public-to-private  transaction  is  constrained  to  the 
developed  markets.  Limited  research  examined  going  private  transaction  in  developing 
countries such as Malaysia. Hence, this study is an initial attempt to find out the factors that 
drive buyouts in the Malaysian stock market.  Second, this study excludes private equity 
sponsored  transactions  from  the  sample  and  provides  evidence  to  the  characteristics  of 
dominant shareholder led buyout. Third, the ownership context in Malaysia is complicated 
with cross shareholdings and stock pyramidal ownership. This complicated arrangement of   2 
ownership structure is different from the publicly traded corporations in US which are widely 
held and controlled by institutional investors (Gaughan, 2007). In the Malaysian market, the 
controlling shareholder may indirectly own the firm through related entities. This makes the 
controlling owners more entrenched as their voting rights may be greater than their cash flow 
rights in the target company held through related corporations. This shareholder structure is 
similar with many Asian countries, for example Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and so forth. 
The research outputs may provide insights to capital markets which have similar concentrated 
and insider controlled shareholder structure about which kinds of firms are more likely to be 
privatized  by  the  owner-managers.  The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows. 
Section 2 describes the data sources, sampling procedures and research methodology. This is 
followed by  discussion  of  empirical findings in  Section 3. The  final  section  presents  the 
concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. Data, sample and research methodology 
 
2.1 Data and sample selection 
 
We identified firms that went private between 2000 and 2007 from the universe of listed 
stocks using the following screening procedures. First, we screened for firms that announced 
going  private  intent  from  corporate  announcement  deposited  at  Bursa  Malaysia 
(www.bursamalaysia.com). Second, to avoid sample negligence, we also read the individual 
firm announcement at EquityTracker (www.klsetracker.com), an independent research portal. 
Third, to confirm the accuracy of our sample, we searched across a full list of de-listing firms 
provided by Bursa Malaysia library and also cross checked a list of firms which received 
takeover offers  from 2000  to 2007  from EquityTracker portal. From  the  lists,  companies 
which were de-listed due to reasons other than privatization were excluded. For example, 
firms involuntarily de-listed by Bursa Malaysia due to incompliance of listing requirement 
are eliminated. Furthermore, banks, real estate and insurance companies were excluded from 
analysis.  It  is  because  their  reporting  practices  are  different  from  other  industries  and 
inclusion of these firms may introduce heterogeneity in the sample (Sorensen, 2000).  
 
The final sample comprises of 60 companies that went private spanning from the period 2000 
to 2007. The 60 ex-quoted firms were matched by another 60 control firms which remain 
listed in 2007 based on the closest asset size and industry. If two and above going private 
firms were matched with the same public company, then the privatisation firm which failed 
the matching was matched with another public firm based on the next-to-closest total asset in 
the same industry. This matching process is identical with Lin and Wang (2007).  
 
We obtained financial data and director shareholdings for going private sample and control 
group  from  the  most  recent  annual  reports  prior  to  the  first  published  going  private 
announcement. For instance, PPB Oil Palms Berhad announced its intention to go private on 
December 14, 2006.  Therefore, the financial statements of PPB Oil Palm and its matched 
sample- Asiatic Development Berhad for the financial year ended 2005 were analyzed. The 
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2.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
The  summary  of  descriptive  statistics  is  reported  in  Table  I.  The  first  column  is  the 
explanatory variables for going private likelihood, and the next four columns are average, 
median, maximum, minimum values for ex-quoted companies and the matched sample. The 
last column provides the t-statistic for the difference in mean.  
 
Table І: Descriptive statistics for going private and non-going private sample 
   Going private company   Control sample  
Variable   Mean   Med.  Max.   Min.  Mean   Med.  Max.  Min. 
  
t-statistic 
CASHPS  0.62  0.40  3.05  0.00  0.41  0.30  2.62  0.00  2.14
** 
INSIDER  23.00  4.39  86.37  0.00  30.56  33.31  74.29  0.00  -1.62 
MB  1.48  0.92  17.83  0.14  1.30  0.80  6.51  0.23  0.53 
OPM  0.14  0.11  0.49  -0.08  -0.06  0.06  0.45  -4.98  2.01
** 
PRICE2NTA  1.65  0.95  17.83  0.24  1.84  0.79  39.29  -4.84  -0.26 
PRICE2SALES  1.76  1.03  10.02  0.05  1.89  1.30  14.22  0.03  -0.32 
DIVPAYOUT  51.51  44.96  219.30  -269.23  214.25  25.80  8333.33  -31.25  -1.13 
DE  1.11  0.63  6.91  0.02  1.21  0.82  6.37  0.01  -0.41 
FRFLOAT  40.18  35.74  82.98  13.63  52.87  49.71  100.00  10.69  -3.64
*** 
Notes: CASHPS is cash/number of shares outstanding; INSIDER is beneficial interest attributable to board of 
directors/total  ordinary  shares;  MB  is  market  price  per  share/book  value  per  share;  OPM  is  operating 
profit/sales; PRICE2NTA is price per share/net tangible asset per share, PRICE2SALES is price per share/sales 
per share; DIVPAYOUT is dividend per share/earnings per share; DE is debt/equity; FRFLOAT is free float 
which is derived by subtracting shareholdings of 5% and above from total issued capital.  
 
The results in Table I show that going private sample has significantly larger cash per share 
than the public counterparts. This is consistent with the assertion that cash rich firms are more 
likely to be taken private. Directors’ shareholdings above 20% for both ex-quoted firms and 
public firms indicate that public corporations in Malaysia are insider controlled. The average 
insider ownership  for  non-going  private  sample  is  higher  (30.56%) than  firms  that  went 
private (23%), but the difference is not significant.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  operating  profit  margin  is  significantly  higher  for  the  estimation 
sample  than  the  matching  sample  at  5%  confidence  level.  It  may  reflect  that  firms  that 
underwent going private exercises are more efficient in core business and operation prior to 
the buyout relative to firms that remain publicly traded. Ex-quoted firms show lower dividend 
payout rate than its comparison sample, but there is no significant difference in their mean. 
The free float variable is significantly lower for buyout firms than matched sample at 1% 
level, suggesting that the ownership is more concentrated and fewer shares are held by the 
public for going private candidates.  
 
 
2.3 Research method 
 
Choice based sampling by matching the sample size and classifying the population based on 
outcome rather than random sampling is used in the study. It is because random sampling will 
result in a smaller number of cases falling into any one of the category (Amemiya, 1985).  
This matched sample design is also used in prior research (see Lehn & Poulsen, 1989; Song 
& Walkling, 1993).  
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Linear probability model is not pursued in the study as it will predict a value greater than 1 or 
less  than  0.  A  logistic  regression  deals  with  limited  dependent  variable  is  employed  to 
estimate the likelihood of going private. The dependent variable is qualitative, taking value of 
1 if going private and 0 if otherwise. The logit model is given as follows:   
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     = odd ratio in favour of going private;  
  Pi       = probability of going private for firm i;  
  1-Pi       = probability of not going private for firm i;  
  CASHPS     = cash/number of shares outstanding;  
  INSIDER     = beneficial interest attributable to board of directors 
              /total ordinary shares;  
  MB       = market price per share/book value per share;  
  OPM       = operating profit/sales;  
  PRICE2NTA    = price per share/net tangible asset per share;  
  PRICE2SALES   = price per share/sales per share;  
  DIVPAYOUT   = dividend per share/earnings per share;   
  DE       = debt/equity;  
FRFLOAT   = total issued capital in percent - sum of shareholdings    
     with more than 5% owned by investors            
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Table  II  shows  the  proxy  variables,  variable  definitions  and  expected  signs  for  each 
independent variable. The likelihood of a firm to go private is expected to increase if the 
expected sign is positive and decrease if the expected sign is negative.  
 
Table II: Going private characteristics and proxy variables 




Cash per share (CASHPS)   Cash/number of shares outstanding   + 
Insider ownership (INSIDER) (%) 
 
Beneficial interest attributable to board of directors/ total 
ordinary shares   + 
Market-to-book value (MB) 
 
Market price per share/book value per share  - 
Operating profit margin (OPM) 
 
Operating profit/sales  - 
 
Price-to-net tangible asset ratio 
(PRICE2NTA) 
 
Price per share/net tangible asset per share  - 
 
Price-to-sales ratio 
(PRICE2SALES)  Price per share/sales per share  - 
 
Dividend payout (DIVPAYOUT) 
(%)  Dividend per share/earnings per share  - 
 
Debt-to-equity ratio (DE)  Debt/equity  - 
Free float (FRFLOAT) (%) 
 
Total issued capital-sum of shareholdings with more than 
5% owned by investors    - 
 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
3.1 Logit regression results 
 
  First, a general unrestricted logit model that includes all available regressors based on 
the prior empirical studies is tested. Due to too many independent factors that may introduce 
noise to the model and reduce the degree of freedom with the addition of each regressor into 
the  model,  the  study  simplifies  the  model  by  reducing  parameters  which  are  the  least 
significant at each stage of testing procedure. The simplification process follows general-to-
specific (Gets) modelling or London School of Economics Approach (LSE) (see  Hendry, 
1993; Campos et al., 2005). Although this approach is developed for time series data, it is 
also used in economic modelling which deals with qualitative variables (see Salavrakos & 
Petrochilos, 2003; Zinkovskaya, 2008).  The final logit estimates are shown in Table III.  
 
Based on Table III, the value of McFadden R
2, one of the measures of pseudo R
2, is 
0.2013. The likelihood ratio statistic for the derived model is 33.4862. The result rejects the 
null hypothesis that all slope coefficients in the estimated model are simultaneously equal to 
zero at 1%  level.  Thus, it is  concluded that all  the regressors  have  significant  effect on 
likelihood of going private. The McFadden R
2  in this study is quite low, however, it is typical 
to get a low R
2 for the limited dependent variable model but it does not indicate that the 
model is poor (Maddala, 1983). In predicting the characteristics of firms that went private for 
the period 1981-1992, Rao et al. (1995) reported that Maddala R
2 for probit model is 31.73%.   6 
On the other hand, Cantarero and Pascual (2007) recorded Pseudo R
2 as low as 11.6% using 
binary choice model. Goodness of fit is of secondary importance when the dependent variable 
is dichotomous. For binary regressand model, the expected sign of coefficient regression and 
significance of the independent variable are more important (Gujarati, 2003). Mackey and 
Currie (2001) stated that McFadden R
2 underestimates the total variation explained by the 
model; therefore the predictive efficacy of the logit model is conservative. The value tends to 
be smaller than R-square. McFadden R
2 which is higher than 0.2 is considered satisfactory 
and a good fit (McFadden, 1974; Green, 2001). 
 
Table III: Logistic regression of the going private probability 
Explanatory variable   Estimate coefficient  
   (Standard error)  
Constant   1.6197
*** 
  (0.6765) 
CASHPS  1.1892
** 
  (0.5533) 
INSIDER  -0.0125 
  (0.0086) 
MB  0.3382
** 
  (0.1563) 
OPM  3.3957
** 
  (1.5158) 
PRICE2NTA  -0.0700
** 
  (0.0338) 
PRICE2SALES  -0.2542
** 
  (0.1296) 
DIVPAYOUT  -0.0011
* 
  (0.0006) 
DE  -0.2581 
  (0.1829) 
FRFLOAT  -0.0373
*** 
  (0.0119) 
LR Statistic   33.4862
*** 
McFadden R
2  0.2013 
Count R
2  0.6917 




* indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The standard errors 
are Huber-White standard errors which adjust for correlations of error terms across observations. LR statistic is 
a chi-square test for all slope coefficients jointly equal to zero.  
 
From the logit model results, it is observed that the fraction of correct prediction for 
the entire sample (120 observations) is 69.17%. In particular, 71.67% of sample firms are 
correctly  classified  for  going  private  cases  while  for  non-going  private  sample,  the 
classification accuracy is lower, which is 66.67%. Hair et al. (2006) mentioned that when 
there is two-group function such as going private and non-going private in this research, the 
classification accuracy of the model should be higher than that can be expected by chance . 
They  suggested  that  at  least  one-fourth  greater  than  the  chance  probability  of  50%  is 
considered  as  an  acceptable  level.  Therefore,  the  overall  classification  accuracy  for  the 
estimated model (69.17%) is considered meaningful and significant in identifying the group 
membership. The prediction accuracies for targets and non-targets noted in this study are 
higher than 62.4% and 60.3% documented by Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) in predicting 
corporate takeovers.  
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Based  on  Table  III,  the  coefficient  of  cash  per  share  (CASHPS)  is  positive  and 
significant at 5% level. A firm with large cash balance has greater likelihood to opt for going 
private  transaction  as  the  cash  to  finance  buyout  is  readily  available.  When  the  market 
condition is weak, buyers may not be able to obtain enough external financing to fund the 
buyout transaction. A highly liquid firm can finance the acquisition using its cash reserve. If 
the target firms have large cash balance and their share prices are trading below fair values, 
the firms are very attractive in the eyes of bidders. In addition, firms with higher cash have a 
reduced need to access the capital market and thus higher propensity to go private. Empirical 
precedence found that liquidity  is  efficient in predicting going private or takeover targets 
(Evans et al., 2005; Gleason et al., 2007).  
 
The  coefficient  of dividend payout  is  negative  and statistically  significant at 10% 
level. The results confirm the agency problem of free cash flow theory advocated by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986). Due to separation of control and ownership in large 
public corporation, conflict of interest occurs between principal and agent. Managers put their 
personal goal ahead of organisational goal by not maximizing the wealth of shareholders. 
Instead, managers tend to increase their control over the firm resources by not disgorging 
cash  dividend  to  equity  holders.  We  found  18.03%  of  sample  firms  that  exited  Bursa 
Malaysia  during  2001-2007  did  not  declare  dividend  one  year  before  the  going  private 
proposals. Besides, Lowenstein (1985) stated that if firms do not distribute cash dividend, it 
may  imply  that  there  is  information  asymmetry  between  the  insiders  and  outsiders.  The 
insiders want to retain cash and later take the company private.  
 
When  stock  prices  fall  and  the  market  perception  towards  the  company’s  future 
prospect does not improve, insider is motivated to take the company private.  An undervalued 
company is a good buy for investors. Price-to-sales ratio (PRICE2SALES) and price-to-net 
tangible asset backing per share (PRICE2NTA), the proxy for undervaluation hypothesis, are 
statistically significant at 5% level. Both variables are of anticipated signs. This indicates that 
there  is  information  gap  between  the  true  value  of  company  between  the  insiders  and 
uninformed market. Our finding is consistent with the assertion of Andres et al. (2004) and 
Weir et al. (2005b) that the propensity of a firm to be taken private increases with the degree 
of undervaluation.  
 
As predicted, lower free float (FLOAT) increases the going private likelihood (p = 
0.01). Lower free float implies that the ownership is concentrated and fewer shares are held 
in the hands of outside minority shareholders. It is consistent with the findings of Jansen and 
Klezmer’s (2003) that positive relation between going private probability and concentration 
of ownership existed in German capital market from 1997 to 2001. With highly concentrated 
insider ownership and lower free float, it is easier for the incumbent management to take the 
firm private. Higher ownership concentration implies higher success rate of going private. 
External shareholders with smaller stake are more likely to accept the offer as shareholder 
intervention is costly and net gain from intervention is small (Kobayashi, 2007).   
 
  The coefficient of operating profit margin is statistically significant and positively 
correlated with going private probability. This finding implies that the lender will judge the 
historical  financial  performance  of  the  pre-buyout  firm.  If  the  managers  are  efficient  in 
managing the firm, the lender will have more confidence towards the going private decision. 
As a result, companies that possess the characteristics of higher profitability are more likely 
to be taken private successfully given the easiness to obtain financial assistance from banks. 
Outside buyer also  prefers a  target firm  with  higher  operating  margin  as  it  serves  as  an   8 
indicator of the company’s future earning capability. This finding is aligned with the studies 
by Palepu (1986), Cudd and Duggal (2000) and Desbrières and Schatt (2002) but inconsistent 
with inefficient management or failing firm hypothesis advanced by Thomsen and Vinten 
(2006).  In  a  more  recent  study,  Brar  et  al.  (2009)  also  found  operating  profit  margin  is 
positively  significant  in  predicting  takeover  targets.  The  possible  explanation  is  that  a 
profitable company  yet  experiences lower valuation  is more likely to go private. Despite 
larger cash and higher operating efficiency as evidenced in this paper, price-to-net tangible 
asset ratio and price-to-sales ratio which proxy for undervaluation hypothesis is significant at 
5% critical level. This motivates the owner-managers to take the company private from being 
devalued by the market.  
 
Insider ownership (INSIDER) and debt-to-equity ratio (DE) are found incapable in 
distinguishing target buyouts from firms that remain quoted. The variables are not significant 
at any conventional significance level. In addition, market-to-book value ratio is not of the 
expected sign although it is statistically significant.  
 
 
3.2 Holdout sample analysis 
 
  Out-of-sample  analysis  is  performed  on  13  public  limited  corporations  which 
announced their intention to go private in 2008 and 13 industry matched sample. The analysis 
is carried out to validate the predictive ability of logit model. Table IV illustrates that 10 out 
of 13 firms (76.92%) are correctly classified as going private cases. In the case of non-going 
private companies, classifications are correct for 7 out of 13 firms (53.85%). The overall 
prediction accuracy of the estimated model is 65.38% (17 correct classifications out of the 
total 26 holdout sample). The classification accuracy for holdout sample shown in Table IV 
(65.38%) is slightly lower than the in-sample prediction accuracy which is 69.17%.  
 
Table IV: Out-of-sample model prediction results 
Going private     0  1  Total 
Count  0  7  6  13 
  1  3  10  13 
%  0  53.85  46.15  100.00 
  1  23.08  76.92  100.00 
Total number of correct prediction: 17 
Percentage of correct prediction: 65.38%. 
 
 
3.3 Robustness checks 
 
Further analysis is undertaken in an attempt to gauge the extent to which the results 
are  robust  using  a  different  research  method.  Probit  model  is  employed  to  check  the 
consistency of the logistic regression results. Table V shows that the likelihood ratio statistic 
for probit model is 33.1328 and it is statistically significant at 1% level, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that all the parameters are simultaneously equal to zero. The fit of the regression, 
judged from the McFadden R
2 is 0.1992. The overall percentage correctly classified using 
probit  regression  for  120  firms  (60  going  private  companies  and  60  matched  sample) 
illustrated in Table V is 68.33%.  
 
Except for the significance level of dividend payout (DIVPAYOUT) which rises from 
10% to 5% and price to sales ratio (PRICE2SALES) which declines from 5% to 10% level, 
the signs and significance levels for the other explanatory variables in Table V are same as   9 
logit estimates. In sum, both probit and logit regression results confirm that firms which have 
higher balance sheet liquidity, higher profitability, more undervalued, lower dividend payout 
and lower free float are more likely to go private. The results are robust over the different 
binary response model. 
 
Table V: Estimates of probit going private likelihood model 
Explanatory variable   Estimate coefficient  
   (Standard error)  
Constant   0.9735
** 
  (0.4031) 
CASHPS  0.6751
** 
  (0.3134) 
INSIDER  -0.0071 
  (0.0051) 
MB  0.1911
** 
  (0.0952) 
OPM  1.9946
** 
  (0.8795) 
PRICE2NTA  -0.0446
** 
  (0.0202) 
PRICE2SALES  -0.1480
* 
  (0.0796) 
DIVPAYOUT  -0.0007
** 
  (0.0003) 
DE  -0.1501 
  (0.1062) 
FRFLOAT  -0.0222
*** 
  (0.0069) 
LR Statistic   33.1328
*** 
McFadden R
2  0.1992 
Count R
2  0.6833 




* indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The standard errors 
are Huber-White standard errors which adjust for correlations of error terms across observations. LR statistic is 
a chi-square test for all slope coefficients jointly equal to zero.  
 
 
4. Summary and conclusion 
 
Going private trend came into the limelight in Malaysia since 2005. The transaction value of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in Malaysia jumped 132% to RM120.4 billion (equivalent 
to US$32.9 billion) in 2006 compared to the previous year (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007). 
This big jump in the transaction value positioned Malaysia third in the Asian mergers and 
acquisitions after China and India (excluded Japan) (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007). Besides, 
the top five mega M&A deals in Malaysia involved going private transactions. Despite the 
growing  popularity  of public-to-private  transaction, there  is  limited  evidence  provided in 
Malaysia.  This  study  focuses  on  management  buy-outs  and  management  buy-ins  and 
excludes  any  institutional  buyout  led  by  private  equity  players.  The  study  suggests  that 
companies which have larger cash balance, higher operating performance, higher degree of 
undervaluation,  lower dividend  payout and  lower  free  float  have  greater likelihood  to be 
taken private as comparable to the public counterparts. Using the logit and probit regression, 
the percentages of correct prediction are 69.17% and 68.33% respectively.  In addition, the 
classification accuracy rate for validation sample is 65.38%.    10 
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